Based Upon  and the False Claims Act\u27s Qui Tam Provision: Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit\u27s Method of Statutory Interpretation by Senagore, Antonio J.
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 9 
9-1-2007 
"Based Upon" and the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision: 
Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit's Method of Statutory 
Interpretation 
Antonio J. Senagore 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Antonio J. Senagore, "Based Upon" and the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision: Reevaluating the 
Seventh Circuit's Method of Statutory Interpretation, 3 Seventh Circuit Rev. 244 (2007). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol3/iss1/9 
This Federal False Claims Act is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-
Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                           Volume 3, Issue 1                           Fall 2007 
 244
“BASED UPON” AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT’S 
QUI TAM PROVISION: REEVALUATING THE 




ANTONIO J. SENAGORE* 
 
Cite as: Antonio J. Senagore, “Based Upon” and the False Claims Act’s Qui Tam 
Provision: Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Method of Statutory Interpretation, 3 






Each year, fraud takes approximately $100 billion from the 
federal government.1 To help recover some of that substantial sum, 
Congress expanded the False Claims Act (“the FCA”).2 Through its 
qui tam provision,3 a plaintiff (called a “relator”) may sue those who 
defraud the government and share the damages the U.S. Attorney’s 
Office ultimately collects.4 But Congress has struggled to keep 
opportunistic relators from using publicly available information to file 
qui tam suits that do not detect any new fraud. In one egregious 
                                                 
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. 
1 See Carl Pacini & Michael Bret Hood, The Role of Qui Tam Actions Under 
the False Claims Act in Preventing and Deterring Fraud Against Government, 15 U. 
MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 273 (2007). 
2 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2002). 
3 Qui tam is shorthand for the Latin maxim qui tam pro domino rege quam pro 
se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who as well for the king as for himself 
sues in this matter.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1282 (8th ed. Bryan A. Garner).  
4 See Pacini & Hood, supra note 1, at 273.  
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example, United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess,5 the Supreme Court let 
a relator proceed even though he copied a criminal indictment 
verbatim into his qui tam complaint.6 Congress amended the FCA to 
prevent such abuse, but those amendments ended up barring 
meritorious qui tam suits. For instance, in United States ex rel. State of 
Wisconsin v. Dean,7 the Seventh Circuit refused to allow the State of 
Wisconsin to act as relator even when it had investigated Medicare 
fraud.8 In rejecting its suit for having relied upon publicly available 
information, the Seventh Circuit stated that “[i]f the State of 
Wisconsin desires a special exemption to the False Claims Act because 
of its requirement to report Medicaid fraud to the federal government, 
then it should ask Congress to provide the exception.”9  
In response, Congress loosened restrictions on qui tam pleading in 
1986 amendments to the FCA. But even while seeking to encourage 
relators to investigate and share their information with the 
government, Congress remained concerned about “parasitic” suits like 
Hess. Teetering between these two competing goals, Congress enacted 
the FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar,10 which bars actions “based upon” a 
“public disclosure,” unless the relator was the “original source of the 
information.”11 Although trying to simplify the FCA, Congress ended 
up confounding the federal courts.12  
                                                 
5 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
6 Id. at 546-48. 
7 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).  
8 Id. at 1102. 
9 Id. at 1106-07.  
10 31 U.S.C § 3729(e)(4). 
11 Id. 
12 For instance, in United States ex rel. Merena v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 
14 F. Supp. 2d 352 (E.D. Pa. 2000), rev’d, 205 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 2000), the 
exasperated district court summed up the difficulty of the issue for the federal courts: 
 
There seems to be no unanimity both among and within individual circuits 
as to when claims are “based upon” public disclosures, what constitutes a 
public disclosure, when and under what circumstances a qui tam relator 
must first inform the government of the claims, the extent of the factual 
information that must be provided to the government prior to filing the qui 
tam action, when a qui tam action must be filed where there has been a 
2
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Last term in Rockwell International v. United States,13 the 
Supreme Court clarified what “original source” means, but did not 
resolve what makes a claim “based upon . . . a public disclosure.”14 
According to the majority of circuits, a qui tam suit is based upon a 
public disclosure “when the supporting allegations are the same as 
those that have been publicly disclosed . . . regardless of where the 
relator obtained his information.”15 However, the Fourth and Seventh 
Circuits follow a minority standard. They interpret “based upon” to 
mean that the suit “both depends essentially upon publicly disclosed 
information and is actually derived from such information.”16 In 
United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC,17 the Seventh 
Circuit reaffirmed its minority standard, emphasizing that it “holds the 
trump card, the plain language interpretation.”18   
This Note urges the Seventh Circuit to re-examine that holding 
according to the three theories of statutory interpretation: textualism, 
                                                                                                                   
public disclosure, what are the requisites to be classified as an “original 
source,” when a claim is “primarily based upon” prior public disclosures 
and many other issues that arise under the statute.  
 
Id. at 371-72.  
13 127 S.Ct. 1397 (2007). 
14 See id. at 1405 (noting that the parties “conceded that the claims . . . were 
based upon publicly disclosed allegations within the meaning of § 3730(e)(4)(A)”).  
15 See, e.g., Minnesota Assoc. of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. 
Corp., 276 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing 
Auth. of the City of Pittsburgh, 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. 
Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 147 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 
1998); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecommns., Inc., 123 F.3d 
935 (6th Cir. 1997); Federal Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447 (5th 
Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 (11th 
Cir. 1994); United States ex. rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 
(D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex rel. the Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc., 971 
F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992). 
16 United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 864 (7th 
Cir. 1999); accord United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 
1339 (4th Cir. 1994). 
17 496 F.3d 730 (2007), reh’g and suggestion for reh’g en banc denied, 2007 
U.S. App. LEXIS 22319, at *1 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 2007).  
18 Id. at 738.  
3
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intentionalism, and purposivism.19 Part I summarizes the history of qui 
tam and the FCA. Part II discusses both sides of the “based upon” 
circuit split. Part III introduces Fowler and the Seventh Circuit’s 
method of statutory interpretation. Part IV evaluates the Seventh 
Circuit’s method according to the three theories of statutory 
interpretation. Part V explains why the Seventh Circuit should 
reconsider its minority approach. While the court purports to follow 
the plain meaning rule, its interpretation deprives “based upon” of its 
ordinary meaning. In addition, the Seventh Circuit ignores the 
legislative history of the FCA, which demonstrates Congress intended 
to limit qui tam suits supported by publicly available information. As a 
result, the court’s interpretation undermines a key purpose of the FCA: 
to prevent parasitic suits. Accordingly, this Note recommends that the 
Seventh Circuit adopt the majority approach.  
 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Qui tam arose from 13th Century English common law.20 Even 
before the Magna Carta, common law qui tam provided an efficient 
way to pursue fraud without government prosecutors.21 In addition, 
private citizens valued qui tam more because it allowed them access to 
Royal Courts.22 Common law qui tam fell into desuetude once Royal 
Courts were opened to all disputes.23 However, Parliament then 
enacted statutes that enabled qui tam actions to redress specific public 
wrongs.24 Only this statutory qui tam entered American law after 
independence.25 Indeed, the first U.S. Congress enacted qui tam 
                                                 
19 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKERIDGE, Jr., et al., LEGISLATION AND 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219, 219-56 (2d ed. 2006) (2001).  
20 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS & QUI TAM ACTIONS 1, 1-7 (2d ed. 
2003).  
21 Id. at 1-8. 
22 Id. 
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statutes in order to supplement the government enforcement against 
fraud.26 
During the Civil War, Congress enacted the FCA to create a new 
qui tam provision to pursue fraud against the Union Army.27 While 
nicknamed the “Informer’s Act” and the “Lincoln Law,” the FCA was 
generally applicable to fraud against the government.28 Fearing 
frivolous suits, Congress required the relator to pay his own legal fees 
and allowed the government to take over the suit entirely at any time 
at its sole discretion.29 These strictures limited the FCA’s use for the 
first decades it existed.30 
Congress amended the FCA in 1943 after the Supreme Court 
controversially upheld a qui tam suit that completely relied on a 
publicly disclosed criminal indictment in United States ex. rel. Marcus 
v. Hess. 31 Electrical contractors employed by the Public Works 
Administration pleaded guilty to criminal fraud.32 Relator Morris L. 
Marcus allegedly copied that criminal indictment into his qui tam 
complaint and—without contributing anything— sought half of any 
subsequent civil judgment.33 Even though the relator contributed no 
additional information, the Court upheld the suit.34 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Hugo Black determined that Mr. Marcus “contributed 
much to the accomplishing of the purposes for which the Act was 
passed” by bringing an allegation of fraud to light.35  Acknowledging 
that Congress might have intended to limit the reward to informers 
who provided new information to civil prosecutions, the Court 
nevertheless concluded that “neither the language of the statute nor its 
history” supported that interpretation.36   
                                                 





31 317 U.S. 537, 547-48 (1943).  
32 Id. at 529 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 545. 
36 Id. at 546. 
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To avoid the outright repeal of the FCA, Congress amended the 
FCA in 1943.37 The 1943 amendments eliminated the Hess end-run by 
barring jurisdiction for relators who had prior knowledge of the 
allegations of a criminal complaint an absolute bar to subject matter 
jurisdiction over qui tam suits.38 In addition, the amendments allowed 
the Justice Department to take over a qui tam case and reduced the 
maximum damages if the government took over the case.39  
These changes initially decreased use of qui tam actions, but 
dramatic government spending growth besides military spending 
following World War II increased the use of qui tam.40  As qui tam 
expanded beyond its historic military bounds, relators started to use 
the FCA against persons and corporations besides government 
contractors.41 But some courts, particularly the Seventh Circuit, 
resisted relators’ use of the FCA in non-military matters. Most notably, 
in United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. Dean,42 the Seventh 
Circuit refused to allow the State of Wisconsin to act as a qui tam 
relator in a Medicaid fraud action, even though the investigation had 
been conducted solely by the State of Wisconsin.43 The court 
concluded that “[i]f the State of Wisconsin desires a special exemption 
to the False Claims Act because of its requirement to report Medicaid 
fraud to the federal government, then it should ask Congress to 
provide the exception.”44 
In 1986 Congress did loosen the restrictions through yet another 
set of amendments.45 Essentially, the 1986 amendments made the 
FCA’s qui tam provision more closely resemble the permissive 
pleadings standards of common law fraud.46 In addition, the 
                                                 
37 Boese, supra note 20, at 1-14. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1-15. 
41 Id. 
42 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984). 
43 Id. at 1102, 1104. 
44 Id. at 1106.  
45 See Boese, supra note 20, at 1-19-1-21 (describing important changes made 
by 1986 amendments).  
46 See Pacini & Hood, supra note 1, at 288.  
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Committee sought to make the FCA more effective against fraud by 
altering the burden of proof and other provisions.47 In its current form, 
FCA relators generally must plead: 1) that a claim presented to the 
government by the defendant; 2) the claim was made “knowingly”; 3) 
that the claim was “false” or “fraudulent;” 4) that the false statement 
was material (in most courts); 5) causation; and 6) damage to the 
federal government.48  A victorious relator might recover somewhere 
between 15 and 30 percent of the total damages.49 In explaining the 
need for these changes, the Senate Judiciary Committee found that 
fraud pilfers taxpayers and “erodes public confidence in the 
Government’s ability to efficiently and effectively manage its 
programs.”50 Moreover, the amendments sought to correct decisions 
like Dean, which restricted the use of the FCA to only military 
procurement fraud.51  
 
II. THE “BASED UPON” CIRCUIT SPLIT 
 
The 1986 amendments included Section 3730(A)(4) of the FCA, 
which deprives a relator of subject matter jurisdiction if her claim is 
“based upon” a “public disclosure” (the “Public Disclosure Bar”), 
unless the relator can establish she was the “original source of the 
information” (the “Original Source Exception).52 Last term in 
Rockwell, the Supreme Court recognized that these are jurisdictional 
components of the FCA.53 In addition, the Court held that the Original 
Source Exception’s phrase “‘information on which the allegations are 
based’ refers to the relator’s allegations and not the publicly disclosed 
allegations.”54 However, the Court has not interpreted the meaning of 
                                                 
47 See Boese, supra note 20, at 1-26. 
48 See Pacini & Hood, supra note 1, at 288-97. 
49 See id. at 298-300.  
50 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 43 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5308. 
51 See id. 
52 31 U.S.C § 3729(e)(4).  
53 Rockwell, 127 S.Ct. at 1406. 
54 Id. at 1408. The Court, per Justice Antonin Scalia, focused on Congress’s 
telling use of the word “information” instead of repeating “allegations or 
7
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“based upon.”55 Thus, the circuits remain split according to two 
different interpretations of “based upon.” Subsection A examines the 
majority standard. Subsection B examines the minority standard.  
 
A. The Majority: “based upon” means “supported by” 
 
The leading circuit court case to interpret the Public Disclosure 
Bar is United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc.56 The 
relator alleged that defendant systematically mismeasured crude oil 
and natural gas for government sale.57 The relator’s allegations 
partially relied on information from some publicly disclosed RICO 
civil suits.58 The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the case, holding 
that “based upon” meant a qui tam action “based in any part upon 
publicly disclosed allegations or transactions.”59 In other words, the 
court determined that “‘based upon’ is properly understood to mean 
‘supported by.’”60 In reaching its conclusion, the court asserted that it 
would not “dramatically alter[] the statute’s plain meaning” by 
interpreting the term “based upon” to mean “solely based upon.”61 The 
court also emphasized that “statutes conferring jurisdiction on federal 
courts are to be strictly construed, and doubts resolved against federal 
jurisdiction.”62 As a result, the court decided that “based upon” acts as 
a “quick trigger” to quickly advance a court’s analysis to the Original 
                                                                                                                   
transactions.” Id. at 1407. Even without considering legislative history, the Court 
wondered why Congress would care about a distinction that caused courts to 
measure “the relator’s information against the often unknowable information on 
which the public disclosure was based.” Id. at 1408. Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that “[t]o bar a relator with direct and independent knowledge underlying 
his allegations just because no one can know what information underlies the similar 
allegations of some other person simply makes no sense.” Id. 
55 See id. at 1405. 
56 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992).  
57 Id. at 550.  
58 Id. at 554-55.  
59 Id. at 553.  
60 Id. at 552.  
61 Id. 
62 United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 
(10th Cir. 1992).  
8
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Source Exception.63 In support of this interpretation, the court 
concluded that it would further two purposes of the FCA: to encourage 
private citizens with first-hand knowledge of fraud to come forward, 
and to avoid parasitic lawsuits that do not disclose fraud.64  
In United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. 
Quinn,65 the D.C. Circuit similarly held that the Public Disclosure Bar 
applies “where all of the material elements of the fraudulent 
transaction are already in the public domain and the qui tam relator 
comes forward with more evidence incriminating the defendant.”66 
However, after parsing the FCA’s language, the D.C. Circuit 
developed a more nuanced definition of “based upon” than the Tenth 
Circuit. The court concluded that “Congress sought to prohibit qui tam 
actions only when either the allegation of fraud or the critical elements 
of the fraudulent transaction themselves were in the public domain.”67 
The court interpretation reconciled the FCA’s text with its legislative 
history, which sought to navigate between two extremes. First, 
Congress evinced that the FCA should not let relators simply copy the 
government’s information verbatim.68 Second, Congress 
simultaneously sought to permit where the relator has real evidence of 
fraud, even if those suits were loosely connected to a public 
disclosure.69 In resolving this dilemma, the court recognized a different 
test:  “whether the information conveyed to the government could 
have formed the basis for a governmental decision on prosecution, or 
could at least have alerted law enforcement authorities to the 
likelihood of wrongdoing.”70 Applying its standard, the court 
                                                 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
66 Id. at 655. 
67 Id. at 654. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 642 F.2d 1373, 1377 
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).  
70 Id. (quoting Cannon, 642 F.2d at 1377).  
9
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concluded that the relator’s information “did not present so clear or 
substantial an indication of foul play” for a qui tam suit.71   
Next, the Third Circuit, per then-Judge Alito, adopted a similar 
approach in United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Authority of 
the City of Pittsburgh.72 The relator, a general contractor, alleged that 
the defendant falsely claimed costs for lead-based paint abatement 
work at city housing projects.73 The relator’s qui tam suit cited 
documents produced through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
request and discovery from a state-court fraud suit.74 The court held 
that the allegations were based upon the public disclosures.75 In 
determining the meaning of “based upon,” the court did acknowledge 
that its ordinary meaning is not “supported by.”76 Even so, the Court 
reasoned that “based upon” should not mean “actually derived from “ 
because that would make the Original Source Exception superfluous.77 
To circumvent the statute’s plain meaning, the court highlighted the 
FCA’s many drafting errors, ultimately concluding that “the qui tam 
provision does not reflect careful drafting.”78 Following similar 
reasoning, five more circuits have held “based upon” essentially 
means “supported by.”79  
                                                 
71 United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 
645, 656 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  
72 186 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1999).  
73 Id. at 379-81. 
74 Id. at 381.  
75 Id. at 388. The Court had first determined this FOIA request qualified as a 
public disclosure. Id. at 383. There is disagreement about this conclusion. See, e.g., 
United States v. Catholic Healthcare West, 445 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 725 (2006); 127 S.Ct. 730 (2006). 
76 Mistick, 186 F.3d at 386. 
77 Id. 
78 United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 186 
F.3d 376, 387-88 (3d Cir. 1999).  
79 See, e.g., Minnesota Ass’n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 
276 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2002); United States ex rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 147 F.3d 821 (9th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. 
McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935 (6th Cir. 1997); Fed. 
Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994). 
10
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B. The Minority: “based upon” means “actually derived from.” 
 
The Fourth Circuit split the circuits in United States ex rel. Siller 
v. Becton Dickinson & Co.80 In a previous suit, a health care distributor 
had sued Becton for breaching its distributorship agreement.81 Becton 
had allegedly feared that the distributor would alert the federal 
government to a scheme to overcharge for health care products.82 
Becton settled that lawsuit so long as the settlement terms remained 
confidential.83 David Siller, the brother of the distributor’s president, 
then sued as relator in a qui tam action based on the overcharging 
scheme, asserting that he learned about overcharging before the 
previous lawsuits were filed and had subsequently investigated the 
overcharging scheme.84  
The Fourth Circuit rejected Becton’s motion to dismiss, holding 
that Siller’s suit was not based upon a public disclosure because 
“based upon” only means “actually derived from that disclosure the 
allegations upon which [a relator’s] qui tam action is based.”85 The 
court relied on the dictionary definition of “based upon” is “to use as a 
basis for.”86 Accordingly, the court determined “it is self-evident that a 
suit that includes allegations that happened to be similar (even 
identical) to those already publicly disclosed, but were not actually 
derived from those public disclosures, simply is not, in any sense, 
parasitic.”87 The court distinguished other cases, asserting that it was 
deciding a case of first impression: whether a qui tam relator may 
derive the factual basis of his action from a public disclosure for it to 
                                                 
80 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir. 1994).  
81 Id. at 1340-41. 
82 Id. at 1341. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347 
(4th Cir. 1994). 
86 Id. at 1348 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
180 (1986)).  
87 Id. 
11
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be “based upon” the public disclosure.88  Moreover, the court rejected 
the majority’s interpretation of “based upon” as “extra-textual 
requirement that was not intended by Congress.”89 Therefore, the court 
held that Siller could qualify as an original source.90 
Besides the Seventh Circuit, only Third Circuit Chief Judge 
Becker has supported the minority standard in dissent, arguing that it 
“alone is faithful to the plain language of the governing statute.”91 In 
rejecting the argument that the FCA was sloppily drafted, Chief Judge 
Becker contended that Congress “drew the line at the point of actual 
public disclosure because it would bring the most fraud to light 
without engendering unnecessary suits.”92 Moreover, he recognized 
that “there is nothing ambiguous about the phrase ‘based upon.’”93  
Finally, he argued that the minority approach did not read the Original 
Source Exception out of the statute for two reasons. First, he noted 
some qui tam suits might fall under the “based upon” language, even if 
they were not completely derived from public disclosures.94 Second, 
he reasoned that the “based upon” and “original source” inquiries 
would, in tandem, successfully deter parasitic lawsuits.95  
 
III. UNITED STATES EX REL. FOWLER V. CAREMARK RX, LLC 
 
In Fowler, the Seventh Circuit readopted the minority standard.96 
Defendant Caremark provides prescription drugs for federal 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1349. 
89 Id. at 1355 
90 Id. at 1351.  
91 United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 186 
F.3d 376, 389 (3d Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J., dissenting).  
92 Id. at 391 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & 
Bustamonte, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Col, 944 F.2d 1149, 1171 (Scirica, J., 
dissenting)). 
93 Id. at 398-99.  
94 Id. at 399. 
95 Id. at 400. 
96 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 739 (7th 
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States ex rel. Mathews v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 
853, 864 (7th Cir. 1999)); accord United States ex rel. Feingold v. AdminaStar Fed., 
Inc., 324 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2003).  
12
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government employee health care plans and employed relators at two 
of its prescription drug facilities.97 The relators brought a qui tam suit, 
alleging Caremark had defrauded the government through several 
overcharging schemes.98 During discovery, Caremark disclosed 
113,000 pages of documents to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.99 When the 
government declined to intervene in the case in January 2006, these 
discovery documents were unsealed in February 2006.100  
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
dismissed the first complaint for failing to meet pleading requirements 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).101 Defendant Caremark then 
moved to dismiss the second amended complaint because the Relator’s 
allegations were “based upon” the discovery materials publicly 
disclosed to the U.S. Attorney’s Office.102 The court denied that 
request, but again dismissed the relator’s complaint under Rule 9(b) 
for failing to “identify a single prescription through which Caremark 
perpetrated the alleged fraud.”103 The relators appealed the dismissal of 
their complaint with prejudice under Rule 9(b), and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed.104  
In an opinion by Judge Kanne, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s holding that the third amended complaint did not meet 
Rule 9(b) requirements.105 But despite Caremark’s urging, the court 
declined to reject its minority interpretation of the FCA’s Public 
Disclosure Bar.106 The court emphasized that the minority approach 
                                                 
97 Fowler, F.3d at 734. 
98 Id. Specifically, the Relators alleged that Caremark defrauded the 
government by failing to credit returned prescription drugs, changing prescriptions 
without proper approval, misrepresenting the savings obtained from its 
recommendations, failing to substitute a generic version of Prilosec, failing to credit 
lost prescriptions, and manipulating the mandatory times for filing prescriptions. Id. 
99 Id. at 735.  
100 Id.  
101 Id. at 739. 
102 Id. at 736.  
103 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 735 (7th 
Cir. 2007).  
104 Id. at 733. 
105 Id. at 739-43. 
106 Id. at 738. 
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“holds the trump card, the plain meaning interpretation.”107 The court 
asserted that, tellingly, the statute did not include a provision barring 
actions that are “the same or substantially the same as the public 
disclosure.”108 Furthermore, the court argued that this strict textualist 
approach properly balances the FCA’s policies.109 Echoing Chief Judge 
Becker, the court reasoned that the FCA’s plain meaning alone 
reflected a careful policy balance in trying to get insiders to come 
forward with information while deterring self-serving opportunists 
who file parasitic lawsuits.110 Even though the court acknowledged that 
perhaps this class of claims should be eliminated, the court declined to 
rewrite the statute, reserving that “policy choice” for Congress.111 
In Fowler, the Seventh Circuit identified two public disclosures: 
Caremark’s discovery disclosures to relators and Caremark’s discovery 
disclosures to the U.S. Attorney.112 The court found no evidence that 
the relators used these public disclosures instead of the inside 
information they obtained while working at Caremark.113 As a result, 
the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that the third 
amended complaint was not actually derived from any publicly 
disclosure.114 Even so, Caremark still prevailed because the plaintiff’s 
complaint did not meet Rule 9(b) requirements.115 
 
IV. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S INTERPRETATION OF “BASED UPON” IS 
INCORRECT UNDER THE THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit reached the right result; it barred 
the relator’s allegations. But in reaffirming its minority interpretation 
                                                 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 739. 
109 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 739 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
110 Id. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. at 736.  
113 Id. at 738.  
114 Id. at 739.  
115 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 739-43 
(7th Cir. 2007). 
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of “based upon,” the Seventh Circuit overlooked important parts of the 
three principal methods of statutory interpretation: textualism, 
intentionalism, and purposivism.116 First, the court does not follow a 
textualist approach because its minority interpretation effectively 
deprives “based upon” of its ordinary meaning. Second, the court 
completely ignores the intentionalist approach because it fails to 
examine the FCA’s legislative history. If it had, the court would have 
seen that Congress enacted the FCA’s 1986 amendments in response to 
the Seventh Circuit’s strict textualist approach. Finally, the court’s 
interpretation undermines the purpose of the FCA to prevent parasitic 
suits. While its interpretation allows the most fraud-catching suits to 
be filed, the court ignores empirical evidence that most of these 
lawsuits are frivolous. Although there is merit on both sides of the 
circuit split, the Seventh Circuit’s failure to fully consider the tools 
each of these methods provides forces future qui tam defendants to 
defend suits on Rule 9(b) grounds that could be more efficiently 
resolved under the Public Disclosure Bar, as Congress likely intended.  
 
A. Textualism: The Seventh Circuit Assumes Away the Difficulties of 
Finding a Plain Meaning of “Based Upon” 
 
Above all, textualists follow the Plain Meaning Rule: “where the 
language of an enactment is clear and construction according to its 
terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable consequences, the 
words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning 
intended.”117 To avoid absurd or impracticable consequences, a court 
cannot interpret words in an overly burdensome or stingy manner.118 
Thus, textualists search for the “ordinary” meaning of a statute’s 
                                                 
116 See generally Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 219-45 (identifying these 
categories).  
117 United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929).  
118 West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991)(“Where 
a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous, we construe it to 
contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the 
body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.”). 
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words. Usually, dictionaries reveal a word’s ordinary meaning.119 But 
judges often disagree over the proper dictionary.120 Besides 
dictionaries, courts will interpret even ordinary terms according to the 
Canons of Statutory Interpretation, which guide interpretation of 
statutes according important assumptions about how legislative action 
should work.121 However, textualists generally avoid consulting a 
statute’s legislative history because only a statute’s text has passed the 
constitutional strictures of bicameralism and presentment; as a result, 
textualists believe legislative history is too malleable for authoritative 
construction.122 
While purporting to follow the Plain Meaning Rule, the Seventh 
Circuit interpreted “based upon” so stingily it deprived the phrase of 
its ordinary meaning. The court’s reliance on a dictionary definition 
elides over other relevant definitions of the term. Webster’s Dictionary 
defines the phrase to mean “to find a base or basis for.”123 This 
definition does support the minority standard because it implies that 
the public disclosure serves as the only basis for a qui tam suit. But 
other dictionaries support the majority approach. For instance, the 
Oxford English Dictionary defines “based upon” to mean “to place on 
or upon a foundation or logical basis.”124 In turn, the Oxford 
Dictionary defines “foundation” to mean “[a] basis or groundwork on 
which something (immaterial) is raised or by which it is supported or 
confirmed.”125 This supports the minority interpretation of “supported 
by.” If two dictionaries support each approach, then the Seventh 
Circuit’s assertion that “based upon” has a unitary meaning simply 
begs the question. In any event, because “based upon” is a 
                                                 
119 See Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 259-61. 
120 See, e.g., Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994). 
121 See Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 259-94 (describing role of canons in 
statutory interpretation); see also id. at 389-97 (collecting canons used by the 
Supreme Court).  
122 See Elliott M. Davis, Note, The Newer Textualism: Justice Alito’s Statutory 
Interpretation, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 988 (2007).  
123 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 180 (1986). 
124 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 979 (1989) (emphasis added).  
125 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 120. 
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colloquialism derived from ordinary conversation, the utility of 
dictionaries is diminished. Unlike words with a defined meaning, 
colloquialisms are simply part of conversational English.126 Justice 
Scalia criticizes the use of Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary because it includes too many colloquial terms.127 Indeed, 
Congress should not have even used the unclear phrase “based upon.” 
If Congress had consulted a style manual, it probably would have 
recommended Congress to use a different construction.128 Thus, these 
sources suggest ”based upon” is an innately ambiguous term.  
Since it lacks a plain meaning, the Canons of Statutory 
Interpretation become most important. Yet the Fowler court 
improperly applied these Canons. In particular, the court disregarded 
the Whole Act Rule, which presumes that Congress uses terms 
consistently throughout a statute.129 Indeed, “it is a cardinal rule of 
statutory interpretation that no provision should be construed to be 
entirely redundant.” 130 Relying on the Whole Act Rule, Judge Alito’s 
Mistick opinion concluded that “based upon” should mean “supported 
by.” 131 Even though its assumption that Congress is an omniscient 
author is undercut by the mistakes in the FCA’s drafting,132 the Whole 
Act Rule properly cautions against the minority interpretation because 
it smothers the Original Source Exception.133  
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit ignored the presumption of 
statutory consistency, which further counsels against turning “based 
                                                 
126 A colloquial phrase is a phrase “having to do with or like conversation,” and 
is thereby more informal. WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 288 (4th 
ed. 2000). 
127 See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228 n.3 (1994). 
128 See, e.g., THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE 202 (15th ed. 2003).  
129 Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 271. 
130 Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (plurality opinion of 
Scalia, J.). 
131 United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 186 
F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 1999). 
132 See id. at 387 -88 (describing mistakes in drafting); Eskeridge, supra note 
19, at 271 (discussing assumptions of Whole Act Rule).  
133 See Mistick, 186 F.3d at 387. 
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upon” into a technical requirement.134 “Based upon” is used throughout 
the FCA. Specifically, it is used in another jurisdictional bar135 and in a 
provision explaining the procedure for modifying or setting aside a 
civil investigative demand. three times in the FCA.136  Moreover, 
perhaps owing to its colloquial nature, Congress constantly uses 
“based upon” in its legislation.137 No similar circuit split yet exists over 
the meaning of “based upon” in other parts of the FCA.138 By 
determining that “based upon” always means “actually derived from” 
if used in its ordinary sense risks calling much of the U.S. Code into 
question, and the presumption of statutory consistency cautions 
against exactly that result.  
More troublingly, the Seventh Circuit appears to rely on the 
Canon of expresio unius, which states that if Congress includes one 
term, it implies the exclusion of all other terms.139 In the words of the 
Fowler court, Congress’s choice of “based upon”  rules out any other 
interpretation of the term.140 Yet the primary justifications for this 
Canon lie in the criminal law context. Like the Rule of Lenity, “[t]his 
                                                 
134 See Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 273-74.  
135 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3) (requiring that “[i]n no event may a person bring an 
action under subsection (b) which is based upon allegations or transactions which 
are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding in 
which the Government is already a party) (emphasis added). 
136 31 U.S.C. § 3733(j)(2)(B) (stating that a petition seeking relief “may be 
based upon any failure of the demand to comply with the provisions of this section 
or upon any constitutional or other legal right or privilege of such person”) 
(emphasis added). 
137 A Westlaw Search conducted November 26, 2007, revealed 949 documents 
in the United States Code using “based upon” in their text.  
138 No published case discusses Section 3733(j)(e)(2). In interpreting Section 
3730(e)(3), the circuits did not similarly split over the meaning of “based upon.” See, 
e.g., Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1998); United States 
ex rel. S. Prawer v. Fleet Bank of Me., 24 F.3d 320, 328 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that 
section 3730(e)(3) typically only bars a qui tam suit “based upon allegations or 
transactions pleaded by the government trying to recover fraud committed against 
it”).  
139 Expresio unius is shorthand for the Latin maxim “expresio unius est 
exclusio alterius.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. Bryan A. Garner), at 620.  
140 See United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 739 
(7th Cir. 2007).  
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rule of thumb rests on the supposition that directives normally allow 
what they don’t prohibit.”141 But the qui tam provision is a unique 
grant of power to private citizens ordinarily reserved for Attorneys 
General. Accordingly, the Public Disclosure Bar is not a prohibition on 
certain conduct. Rather, it simply discusses a baseline rule. Just as 
commanding a child, “Don’t hit, punch, or choke your sister” does not 
permit pinching or pushing, expresio unius should not compel the 
court to let relators bring any action so long as it is not a verbatim 
copy of a public disclosure.142  
Interestingly, no court uses the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
to justify a limitation on the FCA, even though that Canon suggests 
courts should narrowly interpret “based upon.” The Canon counsels 
that “if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving 
a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction 
or general law, the Court will decide only the latter.”143 Indeed, there 
are doubts about the constitutionality of the FCA.144 The FCA raises 
separation of powers issues because it arguably permits the judiciary 
to interfere with the government’s ability to intervene in a suit.145 More 
troublingly, the prosecutorial powers granted to a private citizen may 
violate the Appointments Clause of Article II.146 Thus, interpreting 
“based upon” to increase the power of relators to participate in actions 
may at some point implicate one of these constitutional issues. Even 
though several courts have upheld the constitutionality of the FCA, a 
cautious court should consider the Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
in interpreting the meaning of “based upon.”  Since “supported by” 
creates a better limit on the prosecutorial power granted to citizens 
                                                 
141 Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 263.  
142 See id. 264. 
143 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring). See generally Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 360-67. 
144 See Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 WIS. L. 
REV. 381, 382 n.3 (2001) (collecting scholarship on the issue). 
145 See, e.g., Ara Lovitt, Note, Fight for Your Right to Litigate: Qui Tam, 
Article II, and the President, 49 STAN. L. REV. 853, 867-68 (1997); James T. Blanch, 
Note, The Constitutionality of the False Claims Act's Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 701, 702 (1993). 
146 See, e.g., Lovitt, supra note 145, at 867-68; Blanch, supra note 145, at 702. 
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than “actually derived from,” the Canon counsels against the Seventh 
Circuit’s approach. 
In any event, the Seventh Circuit’s questionable use of expresio 
unius eviscerates the Public Disclosure Bar because it assumes that 
Congress only intended that provision to prohibit qui tam actions 
actually derived from a public disclosure. By so stingily applying the 
Plain Meaning Rule, the Seventh Circuit improperly followed the 
textualist approach. Rather, it merely concluded that the language 
itself clearly reflects “a careful policy balance” that Congress can 
easily change. The colloquial term “based upon” is not easily 
definable, and the text of the FCA does not show that Congress chose 
that term after careful deliberation. Even the Plain Meaning Rule 
recognizes that words may not be given their ordinary meaning if it 
would lead to absurd or impracticable consequences. Moreover, the 
court assumes away the difficulties of amending legislation.147 Instead, 
the court should recognize that the Plain Meaning Rule is so difficult 
to apply here. As a result, the Court should have considered the 
legislative history of the FCA.  
 
B. Intentionalism: The Seventh Circuit Ignored the FCA’s Legislative 
History and Thereby Derogated its Gap-Filling Role  
 
Intentionalists seek to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the 
intent evident in its statute’s legislative history.148 Courts consider 
applicable legislative history according to a hierarchy of reliability.149 
Like a poker game, whoever presents the highest-ranked legislative 
history on point typically prevails. Generally, a Congressional 
Committee Report is most authoritative document because it usually 
describes the need for a statute and the role of each provision in 
serving that need.150 Next, courts consider congressional floor 
debates.151  These statements explain the need for specific provisions, 
                                                 
147 See generally Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 70-80.  
148 See generally id. at 221-26.  
149 Id. at 310-22. 
150 See id. at 317.  
151 See id. 
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but are less reliable because they only reflect the views of one 
legislator— not Congress as a whole.152 After reports and debates, any 
other legislative history is dramatically less reliable because it does not 
explain Congress’s rationale for enacting a statute and is more prone to 
political manipulation by a single legislator.153  
The FCA’s legislative history is as confusing as the term “based 
upon.” The Senate Report best supports the minority position. Led by 
Sen. Charles E. Grassley of Iowa, several Senators introduced the 
False Claims Reform Act to the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
August 1, 1985. 154 The Senate Bill proposed to bar actions: 
 
[B]ased upon allegations or transactions which are the subject 
of a civil suits in which the Government is already a party or 
within six months of the disclosure of specific information 
relating to such allegations or transactions in a criminal civil or 
administrative hearing, a congressional or Government 
Accounting Office report or hearing, or from the news media.155 
 
The Senate Report’s explanation of this provision does not help 
define “based upon.”156 But, indirectly, testimony cited in the Senate 
Report supports the minority’s position. Summarizing the views of 
several witnesses, the Senate Report emphasized that its legislation 
sought to break “the ‘conspiracy of silence’ that has allowed fraud 
against the Government to flourish.”157 The Committee further stated 
that it sought to “rectify the unfortunate result” of the Seventh Circuit 
in Dean, which prevented a state from becoming a relator simply 
                                                 
152 See id. 
153 See id. at 312-18 
154 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5278. 
155 False Claims Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 6 (1986). 
156 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 30, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5294 
(explaining that proposed § 3730(e)(4) would “disallows jurisdiction for qui tam 
actions based on allegations in a criminal civil or administrative hearing, a 
congressional or General Accounting Office report or hearing, or from the news 
media”). 
157 Id. at 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271.  
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because the U.S. Government learned of the fraud through information 
provided by the State of Wisconsin.158 
On the other hand, the House version proposed a Public 
Disclosure Bar that would have triggered under two circumstances. 
First, it would have barred actions “based on specific evidence or 
specific information which the Government disclosed as a basis for 
allegations” in a different proceeding.159 Second, it would have barred 
actions “based on specific information disclosed during the course of a 
Congressional investigation or based on specific public information 
disseminated by any news media.”160 However, the House version 
provided a safe harbor for relators if the Government had the publicly 
disclosed information for six months before the qui tam action was 
filed and the Government did not intervene.161 In addition, the House 
version put the “burden on the defendant to prove the facts warranting 
dismissal of a case under these circumstances”162 
The House Report could also support both positions. In its Report, 
the House Judiciary Committee reaffirmed the need for the 1943 
Amendments in order to prevent frivolous lawsuits like the one the 
Supreme Court upheld in Hess.163 However, the Committee was 
concerned about barring suits where the Government knew of the 
information that was the basis of the suit, but decided not to 
intervene.164 Although the Committee does not cite the case, this 
resembles the Dean situation that the Senate Report explicitly 
mentioned. If so, this language supports the majority position. 
However, the House Report could arguably support the minority 
                                                 
158 Id. at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278. 
159 Proposed 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)(A), as reproduced in H.R. REP. NO. 99-
660 (1986), at 2-3, reprinted in U.S. Cong. Serial Set 13702, 99th Cong. 2d Session, 
January 21-October 18, 1986. 
160 Proposed 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)(B), as reproduced in H.R. REP. NO. 99-
660, at 3. 
161 Proposed 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5)(B)(ii), as reproduced in H.R. REP. NO. 99-
660, at 3. 
162 H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 30.  
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 22. 
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position, since it described these provisions as barring actions based 
“solely” on publicly available information.165  
Since the “based upon” language and the Original Source 
Exception appeared for the first time in the enacted statute, no sponsor 
could even discuss the bar in floor debate.166 And those few statements 
related to the jurisdictional bars preserved in the Congressional Record 
are often incorrect.167 Despite its reduced reliability, the legislative 
history considered as a whole suggests that the enacted statute was a 
compromise. The Senate was particularly concerned with permitting 
states to use publicly available information that they originally found, 
trying to overrule Dean.168 But both the Senate and House Committees 
were concerned about permitting too many frivolous lawsuits like the 
famous Hess example.169  
Presuming that Congress sought to remedy the mischief caused by 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Dean, it seems most probable 
that the enacted bill included the “original source” exception to apply 
to a situation where a State was the original source of fraud allegations 
that it publicly disclosed to the government during a fraud 
investigation. Admittedly, the legislative history does also support the 
minority approach. Indeed, the House Report mentions that the 
jurisdictional bar would apply to those actions based solely on a public 
disclosure, but also sought to encourage the largest number of fraud 
catching suits.170 The Senate Report similarly wanted to encourage the 
largest number of fraud-catching qui tam suits.171 Yet, the Seventh 
Circuit did not address this legislative history at all in Fowler. While 
                                                 
165 H.R. REP. NO. 99-660 (1986), at 22-33, reprinted in U.S. Cong. Serial Set 
13702, 99th Cong. 2d Session, January 21-October 18, 1986.  
166 See Boese, supra note 20, at 4-44.  
167 For instance, Representative Berman explained that the original source must 
have made information available “to the government or the news media in advance 
of the false claims being publicly disclosed.” 132 Cong. Rec. 29,322 (Oct. 7, 1986). 
The statutory language does not support his apparent intent for the jurisdictional bar.  
168 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 12-13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5277-78. 
169 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10-11; 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278. 
170 H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 23.  
171 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13-14; 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5277-78.  
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the Seventh Circuit has previously noted the FCA’s legislative history 
in passing,172 the court has never examined it in detail. The Fowler 
court only avoided discussing legislative history because it incorrectly 
concluded that “based upon” has a “plain language interpretation.”173 
But “based upon” does not seem to have only one meaning, 
particularly because the vast majority of circuits have reached a 
different interpretation of the term. In addition, the Seventh Circuit did 
not seriously consider the notion that its overly strict textualist 
approach in Dean may have caused Congress to amend the FCA in the 
first place, as the legislative history suggests.  
Moreover, by failing to consider legislative intent, the Seventh 
Circuit derogated its responsibility to fill gaps in the application laws, 
particularly when the legislative history suggests Congress intended 
that result. For instance, in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co.,174 the 
Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) requires a 
judge to allow impeachment of a civil witness with evidence of prior 
felony convictions.175 Even though the plain meaning of the rule 
suggested that a judge would weigh the prejudice to the defendant as 
in a criminal trial,176 the Court consulted legislative history that proved 
that Congress’s textual limitation of the prejudice balance to criminal 
defendants “resulted from deliberation, not oversight.”177 Even staunch 
textualist Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, and although he 
did not consider legislative history, he recognized that the literal 
interpretation of the rule “produces an absurd, and perhaps 
unconstitutional result.”178 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit should recognize that Congress 
deliberated the FCA and intended it to continue the protections against 
frivolous suits as in Hess while permitting suits investigated by a 
                                                 
172 United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 857-88 (7th Cir. 1999) 
173 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 738 (7th 
Cir. 2007). 
174 490 U.S. 504 (1989). 
175 Id. at 527. 
176 Id. at 509. 
177 Id. at 523. 
178 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).  
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relator as in Dean. In addition, courts have already filled gaps in the 
interpretation of the FCA. For example, even though it mirrors 
common law fraud pleading requirements, the FCA does not require 
that a “material” false or fraudulent claim in order to impose 
liability.179 However, several circuits infer a materiality requirement 
from common law fraud.180  
Besides following common law fraud requirements, such gap 
filling is warranted because of the difficulty of amending legislation. 
For over 20 years, members of Congress and lobbyists have pushed to 
amend the FCA.181 Indeed, Sen. Grassley recently submitted a bill to 
amend the FCA in light of Rockwell which would, in part, bar claims 
“based on a public disclosure only if the person bringing the action 
derived his knowledge of all essential elements of liability of the 
action or claim alleged in his complaint from the public disclosure.” 182 
While Sen. Grassley evidently supports the minority interpretation of 
the FCA, the Seventh Circuit should not dare Congress to enact 
legislation to retroactively deal with the cases before it.  
Arguably, the Seventh Circuit’s strict textualist approach might 
encourage Congress to draft clearer statutes. But, until Sen. Grassley’s 
bill becomes law, the Senate and House Reports are the most 
authoritative statement of the entire Congress’s intent in enacting these 
amendments that is available. Since those documents suggest 
Congress intended to narrowly abrogate the FCA’s protections against 
parasitic lawsuits in light of Dean, the Seventh Circuit erred by not 
analyzing this legislative history to interpret an ambiguous statute.  
 
C. Purposivism: The Seventh Circuit’s Interpretation Undermines the 
FCA’s Purpose to Prevent Parasitic Qui Tam Suits 
 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit correctly noted the purposes of 
the FCA, but failed to properly analyze how its interpretation affects 
those purposes. As the Supreme Court has long recognized, “a thing 
                                                 
179 See Pacini & Hood, supra note 1, at 293.  
180 See id. at 293-95.  
181 Boese, supra note 20, at 1-34.2 (describing efforts to amend the FCA).  
182 S. 2041, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”183 
Unlike textualists, purposivists generally interpret a statute to further 
the policy reasons for its enactment.184 Of course, Congress enacts 
statutes for several, often competing purposes. Nevertheless, by 
interpreting a statute in light of its general purpose, purposivism 
achieves democratic legitimacy and allows courts to adapt static 
language to new and unforeseen circumstances.185  
In interpreting the FCA, all circuits—even the textualist Fourth 
and Seventh Circuits—have justified interpretations of “based upon” 
in terms of the FCA’s purpose.186 The Seventh Circuit correctly 
recognized the two competing purposes of the FCA’s jurisdictional bar. 
On the one hand, Congress sought to loosen the restriction in order to 
encourage whistle blowing.187 On the other hand, Congress sought to 
deter “parasitic” lawsuits like the FCA’s 1943 amendments sought to 
avoid after Hess.188 Basically, the “based upon” circuit split concerns 
the appropriate balance between these two, competing goals. In the 
Seventh Circuit’s view, Congress’s choice of the phrase “based upon” 
reflects a careful “balance” between these two phrases.189  
While thoughtful, the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning is misguided 
because the court does not consider the best source of Congress’ 
purpose: the FCA’s legislative history. That history shows that 
Congress’ primary purpose was to let one party (particularly a state) 
investigate a fraud, then publicly disclose its information to the federal 
                                                 
183 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).  
184 See generally Eskeridge, supra note 19, at 228-30.  
185 See id. at 229. 
186 Compare United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 
1339, 1354-55 (4th Cir. 1994) with United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch 
Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992) (circuit cases on both sides of split 
supporting their conclusions with discussion of statutory purpose).  
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government.190 In that situation, the relator is likely the “original 
source” of the allegations. Even though Congress was concerned about 
permitting valid qui tam suits, the Seventh Circuit’s narrow 
interpretation of “based upon” overextends to include too many qui 
tam suits. Undoubtedly, some of these suits are frivolous.  
The Seventh Circuit recognized this, but readopted its standard 
because it believes that the majority standard would “eliminat[e] 
otherwise valid claims that Congress currently allows to go forth.”191  
Yet empirical evidence suggests its premise is mistaken. Between 
1986 and 2004, the Attorney General declined to intervene in 78% of 
all cases that where investigation was completed.192 Presuming that the 
Attorney General generally does not intervene in non-meritorious 
suits, one author has concluded that this data suggests that the majority 
of these cases were probably parasitic.193 If so, the FCA should restrict 
more qui tam suits in order to accomplish the purpose of preventing 
parasitic suits. Interpreting “based upon” to bar suits supported by 
publicly disclosed information would accomplish this goal.  
 
V. WHY “BASED UPON” SHOULD MEAN “SUPPORTED BY.” 
 
Perhaps the Seventh Circuit’s approach does reflect the plain 
language of the term “based upon;” it may even accord with 
Congress’s intent and purpose in enacting the Public Disclosure Bar. 
But troublingly, the Seventh Circuit’s method of statutory 
interpretation does not use all available tools of each method of 
statutory interpretation. The court ignores some Canons of Statutory 
Interpretation entirely.194 The court disregards the FCA’s legislative 
                                                 
190 See S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5278; H.R. REP. NO. 99-660 (1986), at 22-33, as reproduced in U.S. Cong. Serial Set 
13702, 99th Cong. 2d Session, January 21-October 18, 1986. 
191 Fowler, 496 F.3d at 739. 
192 Civil Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fraud Statistics-Overview (Mar. 4, 2005), 
at www.taf.org/fcastatistics2006.pdf. 
193 Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An 
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 971 (2007). 
194 See supra notes 129-37; 143-46 and accompanying text. 
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history, and in so doing, asserts a purpose that may not have been 
Congress’s purpose in amending the FCA.195  
These additional tools of statutory interpretation suggest that 
“based upon” should mean “supported by.” Under a textualist Plain 
Meaning Rule approach, “supported by” more comfortably fits in the 
statute. Given that ‘based upon” is a colloquial term, Congress 
probably did not intend it to create a technical, dictionary-based 
requirement. Instead, as the Tenth Circuit recognized, the ordinary 
usage suggests “based upon” would serve as a “quick trigger,” barring 
suits partially supported by public disclosure.196 This interpretation 
accords with the legislative history, which expressed particular 
concern at allowing a suit like Dean while keeping the 1943 
Amendment’s prohibition on parasitic suits. In addition, because 
empirical evidence suggests that many qui tam suits are frivolous, 
interpreting “based upon” to mean “supported by” would further the 
FCA’s purpose to eliminate parasitic suits.197  
Despite these benefits, the majority standard does have costs. 
First, it makes pleading more difficult for relators. This arguably will 
stymie the FCA’s purpose to eliminate the “conspiracy of silence” that 
prevents fraud from coming to light. In addition, there are other 
vehicles to protect against parasitic suits. Keep in mind that Caremark 
ultimately won because the relators did not satisfy Rule 9(b) pleading 
requirements.198 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme 
Court should adopt the majority standard because its benefits outweigh 
these costs. First, Rule 9(b) is an insufficient guard against parasitic 
suits. Indeed, in Hess Mr. Marcus probably would have pleaded fraud 
with particularity when he copied the criminal indictment into his qui 
tam complaint. Thus, the Public Disclosure Bar should provide an 
additional safeguard against parasitic suits.  
                                                 
195 See supra notes 148-93 and accompanying text.  
196 United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 
(10th Cir. 1992). 
197 See Broderick, supra note 193, at 971. 
198 United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 739-43 
(7th Cir. 2007) 
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But what exactly is a “parasitic” suit? To clarify this issue, the 
Seventh Circuit could adopt the First Circuit’s definition of “parasitic” 
as meaning that a qui tam case receives support from the government 
without giving any useful or proper return to the government.199 By 
this standard, the case in Fowler was probably parasitic because it was 
probably partially derived from the U.S. Attorney’s extensive 
discovery. Since the U.S. Attorney did not decide to proceed after that 
fraud, it seems that although the qui tam suit may have brought a fraud 
allegation to light, the U.S. government did not find enough evidence 
of fraud to pursue it.200 Therefore, in combination with the quick 
trigger interpretation of “based upon,” a more specific definition of 
“parasitic” would properly prevent truly parasitic qui tam suits.  
Even though this interpretation makes qui tam pleading more 
difficult for relators, it may further the purposes of the FCA because it 
might encourage better pleading in qui tam suits. In Rockwell, the 
Supreme Court already made pleading more difficult for a relator by 
forcing her to show that she is the original source of every allegation 
in the complaint.201 By additionally requiring that relators show that 
each allegation is not supported by a public disclosure, courts would 
encourage better pleading by relators. In so doing, courts would 
discourage situations like Fowler, where the relators went through 
three dismissed complaints.202 
Most importantly, the Seventh Circuit should realize that its strict 
textualist approach in Dean helped cause Congress to amend the FCA 
in 1986.203 Given the Senate Report’s evident concerns with the Dean 
decision,204 Congress seems to have intended a narrower interpretation 
                                                 
199 United States ex rel. S. Prawer v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 24 F.3d 320, 327-28 
(1st Cir. 1994).  
200 See Fowler, 496 F.3d at 735.  
201 See Aaron P. Silberman & David F. Innis, The Supreme Court Raids the 
Public Disclosure Bar: Cleaning Up After Rockwell International v. United States, 
42 PROCUREMENT LAW 1, 20 (Summer 2007).  
202 See, e.g., Fowler, 496 F.3d at 735. 
203 See id. at 738; United States ex rel. State of Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 
1100, 1106-07 (7th Cir. 1984). 
204 S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 
5278. 
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of the Public Disclosure Bar and Original Source Exception, limited 
only to let relators investigate and share fraud allegations.205 Even so, 
Congress did not intend its amendments to return to the days of Hess-
type parasitic qui tam suits.206 Yet the Seventh Circuit’s current method 
of statutory interpretation suggests that Congress must pinpoint 
exactly what suits to allow and to prohibit when it legislates.207 
Although this might encourage Congress to draft statutes more 
precisely, it derogates the Court’s historic gap-filling role for unclear 
statutes.208 Moreover, as then-Judge Alito recognized in his Mistick 
opinion, a strict textualist interpretation renders superfluous the 
original source exception, thereby smothering its protection against 




In its efforts to clarify the FCA, Congress unfortunately chose the 
phrase “based upon” for its Public Disclosure Bar. Yet that poor word 
choice should not defeat the ordinary meaning of the phrase. 
Moreover, that choice should not defeat Congress’s intent and purpose 
in enacting the FCA. As the Supreme Court recently recognized in 
Rockwell, the FCA’s Public Disclosure Bar is anything but clear. In 
addition, Justice Alito—the author of Mistick—now sits on the 
Supreme Court. Since his opinion went beyond the difficult text of the 
FCA to consider legislative history, purpose, and common sense, his 
approach should be persuasive when the Court inevitably resolves this 
circuit split. In any event, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits should re-
evaluate their minority standard in terms of the three methods of 
statutory interpretation, and realize their errors in reasoning. Until they 
                                                 
205 See id.; H.R. REP. NO. 99-660 (1986), at 22-33, as reproduced in U.S. Cong. 
Serial Set 13702, 99th Cong. 2d Session, January 21-October 18, 1986.  
206 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278; H.R. 
REP. NO. 99-660, at 30. 
207 See United States ex rel. Fowler v. Caremark Rx, LLC, 496 F.3d 730, 738 
(7th Cir. 2007); Dean, 729 F.2d at 1106-07. 
208 Cf. Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 523-27 (1989). 
209 See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Hous. Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 
186 F.3d 376, 387 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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do, qui tam litigants will have to wait for the Supreme Court or 
Congress to clarify this confusing provision of the FCA.  
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